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1. INTRODUCTION
The passing of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act'
("The Affordable Care Act"/"The Act") was not easy, and it was not
pretty. President Barack Obama angered his opponents with a push for a
public option, and angered his base when he abandoned it.2 Senators
traded the limelight, facing scorn and scrutiny for special treatment like
the "Comhusker Kickback."3 The debate was acrimonious. Televised
town hall meetings showed testy exchanges between congressmen and
their constituents. A woman asked Massachusetts Representative Barney
Frank how he could support a Nazi policy (referring to health care
reform); Frank responded: "Trying to have a conversation with you
would be like trying to argue with a dining room table."' During a
speech by Obama, in "an angry and very audible outburst," South Caro-
lina Representative Joe Wilson shouted "You lie!" at the president when
he declared that "Democratic health proposals would not cover illegal
* University of Miami Law Review; University of Miami School of Law, Class of 2013;
B.A. 2010, University of Pittsburgh. Thank you to my family, friends and teachers for their
continued support. Thank you Tal Lifshitz, for encouraging me to write. To my fellow students
with whom I speak and exchange ideas, you make this institution a school in the noblest sense of
the word; to you I am most grateful.
1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 214 Stat. 1029.
2. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, 'Public Option' in Health Plan May Be Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/health/policy/18talkshows.html?pagewanted=all.
3. Kevin Sack, Florida Suit Poses a Challenge to Health Care Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
2010, at AO.
4. Carolyn Ryan, The Always Quotable, Not Perfect Gentleman From Massachusetts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2011, at A25.
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immigrants." '
Though the Affordable Care Act somehow emerged as law from
this political brouhaha, its saga of controversy has hardly ended. Imme-
diately after the bill became law, attorneys general from states all over
the country challenged it. After months of at first District and then Cir-
cuit decisions, the question of the Mandate's constitutionality is headed
to the final arbiter of that question-the Supreme Court. The Circuit
split involves many discrete issues, some due to factual differences in
the cases challenging the Mandate. This article focuses primarily on the
question of the constitutionality of the Act's provision, called the mini-
mum coverage provision and known as the Individual Mandate ("The
Mandate"). The Sixth and D.C. Circuits have declared the Mandate con-
stitutional. The Fourth Circuit dismissed a case challenging the Act for a
lack of standing. The Eleventh Circuit has declared the Mandate uncon-
stitutional, yet severable from the rest of the Act. The Eleventh Circuit
appeal is the one that has been granted certiorari in the Supreme Court.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is a massive regu-
lation, touching on many aspects of the health care and health insurance
markets. The offending provision, the Individual Mandate, requires most
Americans to maintain a minimum health insurance policy; if they don't
have one, they must purchase one. Specifically, the Mandate is a
"[lr]equirement to maintain minimum essential coverage."6 "Minimum
essential coverage" includes minimum coverage under any number of
public and private insurances, including the following: "Government
sponsored programs" (such as Medicare and Medicaid); "Employer-
sponsored plan[s]"; "Plans in the individual market"; Grandfathered
health plan[s]"; and "Other coverage."' The requirement is as follows:
"An applicable individual shall for each month beginning after 2013
ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an
applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for
such month."' With exceptions, the Mandate includes a "shared respon-
sibility payment." This payment is the rub. It a penalty imposed on any
applicable individual (or his dependent who is an applicable individual)
who fails to maintain minimum essential health coverage.' There are
many exceptions to the Mandate's requirement and the penalty concomi-
tant to noncompliance. In other words, non-applicable individuals are
not subject to the Mandate's requirements. They include "Religious con-
5. Carl Hulse, In a Lawmaker's Outburst, a Rare Breach of Protocol, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
2009, at A26.
6. 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2010).
7. Id. § 5000A(f)(1)(A)-(E).
8. Id. § 5000A(a).
9. Id. § 5000A(b).
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science exemption[s]," "Individuals not lawfully present" (notwithstand-
ing Rep. Joe Wilson's opinion to the contrary), and "Incarcerated
Individuals."'o Further, the following individuals are exempted from the
penalty: "Individuals who cannot afford coverage"; Taxpayers with
income below filing threshold"; Members of Indian tribes"; and those
who face "Hardships."" With respect to enforcement, the Mandate is
toothless: it includes a waiver of criminal penalties for any taxpayer fail-
ing to pay the penalty, and as it forbids the secretary from assessing any
lien or levy on a taxpayer for failure to pay the penalty.' 2
Is the Individual Mandate constitutional? We do not know, and we
will not know until the Supreme Court tells us. The Supreme Court is
right because it is final, not the other way around. This article proposes
how the Mandate ought to be considered in light of the Supreme Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. To answer the constitutional question,
I will first examine many of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause
cases. Then I will discuss how, in light of the Supreme Court's prece-
dent, the Mandate seems to be a constitutional exercise of the commerce
power. I will examine the circuit court cases that have addressed the
issue so far, identifying strengths and weaknesses in their arguments for
and against a finding of the Mandate's constitutionality. Specifically, I
will demonstrate the error in the efforts to categorize the subject of regu-
lation under the Mandate; I will show how textual and doctrinal argu-
ments fail to attack the Mandate, and how the slippery slope and
federalism-based arguments to which the Mandate's opponents resort
are unsupported and unconvincing. Ultimately, I conclude that the Indi-
vidual Mandate is a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regu-
late interstate commerce. If the Individual Mandate ought to be
considered unconstitutional, it is not for any argument I have encoun-
tered. If the Individual Mandate is declared unconstitutional, an opinion
holding so cannot exist in the same legal universe as certain cases con-
sidered valid precedent today.
II. THE STATE OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE TODAY: WHAT WILL THE
SUPREME COURT Do WITH ITS PRECEDENT?
The Commerce Power was once considered a rigid, inflexible
power. Exercises of it were analyzed along dichotomies that parsed the
power into artificial categories. Over time, the Supreme Court has aban-
doned such a restrictive approach, and has invalidated such preclusive
distinctions. Today, courts understand the Commerce power as plenary,
10. Id. § 5000A(d)(1)-(4).
11. Id. § 5000A(e)(1)-(3), (5).
12. Id. § 5000A(g)(2).
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unimpeded by jealous distinctions and far in its reach. The power is
subject to certain limitations as defined in recent cases.
Article 1, Section 8, of the Constitution states: "The Congress shall
have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... " At first, the
Supreme Court, through Justice Marshall, defined the power-and
defined Commerce-broadly, our constitution being "one of enumera-
tion, and not of definition . . . ."" In the seminal case of Gibbons v.
Ogden, the Marshall court rejected an argument that commerce did not
embrace navigation. "Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is some-
thing more: it is intercourse."" The Court refused to so confine the com-
merce power, and defined it as follows: "It is the power to regulate; that
is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed."l 6
That Justice Marshall broadly defined commerce and Congress's
power to regulate it is in some respects a natural consequence of the way
our Constitution is written. "The constitution sets up the conflicting ide-
als of the community in certain ambiguous categories."" Commerce is
one such ambiguous category. However, it is just as natural a conse-
quence that the Supreme Court refined the commerce power in some
late-19th, early-20th century decisions. "These categories," after all,
"bring along with them satellite concepts covering the areas of
ambiguity."'
In E.C. Knight Co., the Court struck down a regulation of sugar
monopolies because the regulation reached manufacturing. The Court
saw manufacturing as beyond the reach of Congress's commerce power.
The Court reasoned: "Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a
part of it."' 9
Carter v. Carter Coal Co. similarly discountenanced the Bitumi-
nous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, in part because it regulated min-
ing. The Court defined commerce as "'intercourse for the purposes of
trade,'" 20 and excluded mining from this definition. "Mining," the Court
reasoned, "brings the subject-matter of commerce into existence. Com-
merce disposes of it."2' The Court further distinguished between produc-
tion and commerce: "[T]he effect of the labor provisions of the act ...
13. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
14. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824).
15. Id. at 189.
16. Id. at 196.
17. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 7 (1949).
18. Id. at 7.
19. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895).
20. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 298 (1936).
21. Id. at 304.
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primarily falls upon production and not upon commerce; and confirms
the further resulting conclusion that production is a purely local activ-
ity." 22 The Court was concerned about the reach of Congress into purely
local activities. Even if such local activities found their way into inter-
state commerce, "the local character of mining, of manufacturing, and of
crop growing is a fact, and remains a fact, whatever may be done with
the products." 23 Though evils may result from such local activities, "the
evils are all local evils, over which the federal government has no legis-
lative control."24
In these early cases, the Supreme Court refined the breadth with
which Marshall originally spelled out the commerce power in Gibbons
v. Ogden, compartmentalizing the commerce power into the satellite
concepts of manufacturing, distribution, crop-growing, mining, produc-
tion, etc. Although the Court allowed Congress to regulate intrastate
transactions having an impact on interstate commerce in the Shreveport
Rate Cases, the Court limited Congress's reach in A.L.A. Schecter Poul-
try Corp. to intrastate transactions having "[d]irect effects"2 5 on inter-
state commerce. 26 But this refinement did not last. Starting in 1937 the
Supreme Court began to change its course.
In Jones v. Laughlin Steel Corp. the Supreme Court began to adopt
a broader view of the commerce power, more in line with Marshall's
original delineation: "The fundamental principle is that the power to reg-
ulate commerce is the power to enact 'all appropriate legislation' for 'its
protection and advancement'; to adopt measures 'to promote its growth
and insure its safety'; 'to foster, protect, control and restrain.' "27 In
United States v. Darby," the Court overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart,2 9
which held that "Congressional power to prohibit interstate commerce is
limited to articles which in themselves have some harmful or deleterious
property."o The Darby Court as well adopted a broad reading of the
Commerce Clause: "The power of Congress over interstate commerce is
not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends
to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the
exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them
appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 308.
25. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935).
26. Houston, East & West Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914).
27. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 12 (1937) (citations omitted).
28. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 117 (1918).
29. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
30. Darby, 312 U.S. at 116.
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the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce."31
Finally, in Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court reevaluated "the
course of decision under the Commerce Clause . . . ."3 The Court
addressed a challenge to the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The wheat-
farmer plaintiff, Filburn, challenged the wheat marketing quota provi-
sions of the act, which restricted his ability to produce wheat, even if
that wheat were to be used for home consumption and not for sale. Fil-
burn had harvested 239 bushels in excess of his allotment, and had
refused to pay the penalty for doing so-49 cents a bushel. The Court's
decision in Darby had made it clear that Congress had the power to
regulate production"; the problem for farmer Filburn was that "this Act
extends federal regulation to production not intended in any part for
commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm." 34 In line with the
restrictive Commerce Clause jurisprudence the Court had previously
adopted, Filburn argued that the Act regulated production and consump-
tion-local activities beyond the reach of congressional power, the
effects of which are at best indirect. The government argued that the
Act regulated neither production nor consumption, but marketing.36 The
Wickard Court recognized that these arguments were in error, and based
on an overly restrictive view of the commerce power as enunciated in
previous cases. Generously, the Court described the restrictive language
in previous cases as "a few dicta and decisions of this Court which
might be understood to lay it down"3 7 that such restrictions are valid.
The Wickard Court then set the record straight: "We believe that a
review of the course of decision under the Commerce Clause will make
plain, however, that questions of the power of Congress are not to be
decided by reference to any formula which would give controlling force
to nomenclature such as 'production' and 'indirect' and foreclose con-
sideration of the actual effects of the activity in question upon interstate
commerce."38 In realizing this, the Wickard court upheld the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act. It mattered not that Filburn's activity may have
been local or not regarded as commerce. It mattered not that the Act
would force him into the market to buy wheat he could provide for him-
self. Whatever the nature of Filburn's activity, it may "be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate com-
31. Id.
32. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).
33. Id. at 118.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 119.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 120.
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merce." 39 After all, "'commerce among the states is not a technical legal
conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business."' 40
Thus, Wickard was able to "bring about a return to the principles first
enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden . . . ."' For
all of the previous parsing, Filburn's arguments would no longer do in a
Commerce Clause analysis. His wheat competed with interstate com-
merce in that his consumption of homegrown wheat withdrew from the
purchases of wheat in the market that he would otherwise make. The
reasoning has come to be known as the aggregation principle, and was
formulated in Wickard as follows: "That appellee's own contribution to
the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove
him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution,
taken to together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from
trivial."4 2 Filbum would have to limit his wheat acreage, or pay his 49
cents a bushel.
The plenary power of Congress, realigned in Wickard to conform to
the original understanding that Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce is broad, is perhaps best exemplified by the seminal case of
Heat of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States.4 3 There, a hotelier who "had
followed a practice of refusing to rent rooms to Negroes"4 4 sought a
declaratory judgment "attacking the Constitutionality of Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964."45 The hotelier's contention was that "Con-
gress in passing this [Civil Rights] Act exceeded its power to regulate
commerce. .. ."46 Even though the Civil Rights Act was passed carrying
no congressional findings, the Court concluded that "congress possessed
ample power in this regard"47 to legislate in response to the burdens that
racial discrimination had on interstate commerce. The Court assumed it
to be true that the Heart of Atlanta Motel was "of a purely local charac-
ter," but "'[i]f it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not
matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze.' '"48 "How
obstructions in commerce may be removed-what means are to be
employed-is within the sound and exclusive discretion of the Con-
gress. It is subject only to one caveat- that the means chosen by it must
39. Id. at 125.
40. Id. at 122 (citing Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S 375, 398 (1905)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 127-28 (citations omitted).
43. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
44. Id. at 243.
45. Id. at 242.
46. Id. at 243.
47. Id. at 252.
48. Id. at 258 (quoting United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464
(1949) (alteration in original)
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be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution. We can-
not say that its choice here was not so adapted. The Constitution requires
no more." 49
It is not as though the commerce power cannot be analyzed beyond
the constitutional text that describes it, nor conceptually parsed at all.
The ambiguity of the constitutional language requires interpretation,
which is why the parsing by previous courts was natural. Wickard, how-
ever, exemplified the principle that "no satellite concept, no matter how
well developed, can prevent the court from shifting its course, not only
by realigning cases which impose certain restrictions, but by going
beyond realignment back to the over-all ambiguous category written into
the document. The constitution, in other words, permits the court to be
inconsistent."5 0 It is against this backdrop of permissible inconsistency,
and of the Commerce Clause's ambiguity, that, starting in the 1990's,
the Supreme Court began again to strike down congressional exercises
of its commerce power. Two cases are of particular importance to the
courts that have examined the Individual Mandate: United States v.
Lopez' and United States v. Morrison.5 2
In Lopez, the Court decided that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990 exceeded congressional authority to regulate commerce. The Act
made it a federal offense for any individual to knowingly possess a fire-
arm5 in or near a school zone. The Court's objection lay in how the act
"neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that
possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce." 5 4 In a
move reminiscent of early, restrictive Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
the Lopez Court distilled prior Commerce Clause cases into three cate-
gories of activity that Congress can regulate under its commerce power:
channels of commerce, instrumentalities of commerce, and activities
affecting interstate commerce.5 5 (With respect to the Individual Man-
date, the Circuits agree 56 that its subject of regulation falls within the
third category-"those activities having a substantial relation to inter-
state commerce."5 ) The Lopez Court concluded that "the proper test [of
a regulation's validity] requires an analysis of whether the regulated
49. Id. at 261-62.
50. Levi, supra notel7, at 7-8.
51. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
52. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
53. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
54. Id. at 551.
55. Id. at 558-59.
56. See Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 684 F.3d 1235, 1284 n.83 (llth
Cir. 2011); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 567 (6th Cir. 2011).
57. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
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activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce,"" as opposed to
whether the regulated activity merely "affects." The Court rested its
analysis on distinctions between economic and non-economic, 59 and
between commercial and non-commercial6 0 subjects of regulation. Ulti-
mately the court refused to uphold what it regarded as the regulation of
non-commercial, criminal activity by a statute with no jurisdictional
hook, particularly where "neither the statute nor its legislative history
contain[s] express congressional findings regarding the effects upon
interstate commerce of gun possession in a school zone."6 1
United States v. Morrison also involved the regulation of criminal
activity-specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which "provides a civil rem-
edy for the victims of gender-motivated violence."6 2 The Court found
the act to be an unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power for
reasons similar to those the Lopez Court adopted in invalidating the
Gun-Free School Zones Act. The economic/non-economic distinction
was important: "Gender motivated crimes of violence are not, in any
sense of the phrase, economic activity."6 3 And the Court found as its
other limitation the preservation of what is truly national and truly local
by guarding against too-attenuated connections between the subject of
regulation and interstate commerce: "The Constitution requires a distinc-
tion between what is truly national and what is truly local. In recogniz-
ing this fact we preserve one of the few principles that has been constant
since the clause was adopted."6 4
The last case to address a challenged exercise of the commerce
power was Gonzalez v. Raich.6 5 There, plaintiffs sought to prohibit the
enforcement of the federal Controlled Substances Act, "to the extent it
prevents them from possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing cannabis for
their personal medical use" 6 6-activity which was then legal under Cali-
fornia law. The Raich Court upheld the Controlled Substances Act. It
found parallels between the facts before it and the facts in Wickard. Just
like home-consumed wheat would withdraw from the interstate wheat
market, thereby bringing it under congressional authority to regulate,
home-consumed marijuana would withdraw from the interstate mari-
58. Id. at 559.
59. Id. at 560 ("Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation
regulating that activity will be sustained").
60. Id. at 565-66 (discussing arguments over whether exercises of the commerce power
would "fall on the commercial side of the line").
61. Id. at 562 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
62. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601.
63. Id. at 613.
64. Id. at 617-18 (citations omitted).
65. 545 U.S. I (2005).
66. Id. at 7.
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juana market, thereby bringing it under congressional authority to regu-
late. That the marijuana market is unlawful "is of no constitutional
import." 67 Like the Wickard Court, the Raich Court considered it mis-
guided to parse the commerce power, and took a broad view of the Com-
merce Clause: "In assessing the validity of congressional regulation,
none of our Commerce Clause cases can be viewed in isolation"; "our
understanding of the reach of the Commerce Clause, as well as Con-
gress' assertion of authority thereunder, has evolved over time."" The
Court found the regulation valid, even though it "ensnares some purely
local activity."6 9 The Court invoked the aggregation principle, and
declared that "the task before us is a modest one. We need not determine
whether respondents' activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially
affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a 'rational basis'
exists for so concluding."70
A number of principles emerge from the Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. Formulae and rigidity are disfavored. It is not proper to
parse the commerce power along artificial distinctions between mining,
manufacture, production, agriculture, etc. The three broad categories
into which Lopez distilled the commerce power are considered valid,
though with respect to the Individual Mandate this will likely engender
no dispute, as the Circuits are in agreement that the Mandate regulates
under the third category-"activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce."" Although dichotomies and categorization are
disfavored, Lopez established that economic/non-economic, and com-
mercial/non-commercial distinctions deserve weight in considering a
congressional exercise of the commerce power. Raich reiterates the
"evolved" nature of the Commerce Clause. It firmly reinforces the valid-
ity of the aggregation principle, the deference to congressional judgment
concerning an activity's effects on interstate commerce, and allows for
the regulation of purely local activity. Morrison counsels that such regu-
lation will be valid so long as it does not involve too-attenuated a con-
nection between the subject of regulation and interstate commerce such
that it obliterates any distinction between what is truly national and what
is truly local.72
Raich is the Supreme Court's most recent Commerce Clause deci-
sion. How should the Supreme Court consider the Individual Mandate in
light of its precedents? To see the different possibilities, I turn to an
67. Id. at 19.
68. Id. at 15-16.
69. Id. at 22.
70. Id. at 22 (citations omitted).
71. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
72. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
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examination of the Circuit Court decisions that have so far addressed the
Mandate.
III. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE As APPLIED TO THE
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE
Immediately after President Obama signed the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, "[a]ttorneys general in more than a dozen
states, most Republican, filed lawsuits contending that the measure is
unconstitutional."7 3 After numerous District Court decisions, appeals
were decided by the Fourth, Sixth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits on vari-
ous issues. The Sixth and D.C. Circuits rejected challenges to the Act's
constitutionality. The Fourth Circuit dismissed a case challenging the
Act for lack of standing. The Eleventh Circuit has declared the Individ-
ual Mandate unconstitutional, yet severable from the rest of the Act. The
Eleventh Circuit appeal is the one that has been granted certiorari in the
Supreme Court.7 4 One commonality to emerge from the cases is the
rejection of the contention that the individual mandate "is actually a tax
that must be paid by individuals who fail to meet a minimum level of
health insurance coverage."7 5 The circuits disagree over whether the
Mandate is a constitutional exercise of the commerce power. In answer-
ing whether it is or is not, the courts grapple with how to categorize the
subject of regulation under the Individual Mandate. It seems not to fit
neatly into extant conceptions of commerce. For the Eleventh Circuit,
this is fatal; for others-and I argue that this is the correct iriterpreta-
tion-this is irrelevant. The courts also grapple with the outer bounda-
ries of the commerce clause; or more specifically, they worry about how
our understanding of the commerce power might change if the Individ-
ual Mandate is to be included within it. The courts therefore search for
limiting principles to apply to the mandate; otherwise, the fear is that a
countenancing of the mandate will implicitly grant Congress a com-
merce power of unlimited scope. I reject the contention of the Mandate's
opponents, that it contains no limiting principles and will open the door
to unlimited congressional authority. Each case is limited at least by its
facts. The Individual Mandate is easily distinguishable from future
doomsday scenarios that its opponents portend. Another material factor
73. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, With a
Flourish, N.Y. TIMES, March 24, 2010, at A19. For an excellent treatment of the standing issues
raised by the Affordable Care Act, see Gayland 0. Hethcoat II, Plaintiff Standing in Florida ex rel.
Bondi and the Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 65 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 1241, 1258-1276 (2011).
74. 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
75. Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of
Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, *2 (2011).
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in the courts' analysis is that the facts of the Mandate lend themselves
readily to a comparison with those in Wickard, the question being
whether or to what extent the aggregation principle applies to the Man-
date. I argue that aggregation applies. Failing on all other points, argu-
ments against the Mandate seem to reduce themselves to slippery slope
arguments and loosely defined federalism concerns. Ultimately, none of
these arguments are fatal to the Mandate. The sensible conclusion is to
consider the Mandate as a valid exercise of the commerce power.
A. Categorization
The circuits that have examined the Mandate all grappled (some
more than others) with the same question: What exactly does the Man-
date regulate? Is it a regulation of inactivity? Of decisions not to
purchase health care? Or perhaps of self-insuring? Though I believe the
Mandate is not as unprecedented as some commentators have suggested,
it certainly strikes the courts as something new under the sun. In this
way the Mandate, difficult to pigeonhole as it is, presents an excellent
opportunity to see how the courts will follow the course of the Com-
merce Clause decisions.
To the courts in Seven-Sky v. Holder"6 and in Thomas More Law
Ctr., the categorization effort was not too troubling. Both courts faced
arguments that the Mandate regulated inactivity, and was therefore
impermissible regulation. "Congress's authority," the argument went,
"extends only to existing commerce; i.e. only to individuals who take
affirmative acts that bring them into, or substantially affect, an interstate
market, and only for the duration of those activities."7 7 The Seven-Sky
court acknowledged the novelty of the Mandate, but gave the fact of that
novelty only so much weight on the constitutional scale:
The mandate, it should be recognized, is indeed somewhat
novel, but so too, for all its elegance, is appellants' argument [against
it]. No Supreme Court case has ever held or implied that Congress's
Commerce Clause authority is limited to individuals who are pres-
ently engaged in activity involving, or substantially affecting, inter-
state commerce.
Starting first with the text of the Commerce Clause, and finding no
restriction to "existing activity" there, the Seven-Sky court then moved
on to the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause decisions. As did the
Wickard court, the Seven-Sky court recognized that the evolution of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence was toward the rejection of similar
76. 661 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2011).
77. Id. at 14.
78. Id. at 16.
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unworkable distinctions.7 9 It quotes Wickard: "The stimulation of com-
merce is a use of the regulatory function quite as definitely as prohibi-
tions or restrictions thereon."so The Seven-Sky court highlights the
unworkability of an activity requirement for congressional regulation:
"were 'activites' of some sort to be required before the Commerce
Clause could be invoked, it would be rather difficult to define such
'activity.' "s'
The court in Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs.
showed such difficulty. It dealt with an appeal from a Florida District
Court opinion, in which Judge Vinson expressly held that "'activity' is
an indispensable part [of] the Commerce Clause analysis" and that "the
Constitutionality of the individual mandate will turn on whether the fail-
ure to buy health insurance is 'activity."' 8 2 The HHS court at first dis-
claimed this activity/inactivity distinction: "Whereas the parties and
many commentators have focused on this distinction between activity
and inactivity, we find it useful only to a point"; "we are not persuaded
that the formalistic dichotomy of activity and inactivity provides a work-
able or persuasive enough answer in this case."8 4 Yet it is clear that,
though the HHS court dismisses the activity/inactivity distinction in
style, it sticks to the distinction in substance. This is most evident in two
portions of its opinion: in its discussion of Wickard, and in its discussion
of the "temporal leap problem."
"The wheat-acreage regulation imposed by Congress, [in Wickard,]
even though it lies at the outer bounds of the commerce power, was a
limitation-not a mandate-and left Filburn with a choice. The Act's
economic mandate to purchase insurance, on the contrary, leaves no
choice and is more far-reaching."" This distinction, the HHS court
writes, "strikes at the heart of whether Congress has acted within its
enumerated power. Individuals subjected to this economic mandate have
not made a voluntary choice to enter the stream of commerce, but
instead are having that choice imposed upon them by the federal govern-
ment. This suggests that they are removed from the traditional subjects
of Congress's commerce authority."" Missing from the court's analysis
79. Id. at 18.
80. Id. at 17 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128) (emphasis in original).
81. Seven-Sky, 661 F. 3d at 17. In light of the extant baffled commentary trying to categorize
the subject of the Mandate's regulation, this sentiment sounds nearly humorous when phrased as a
hypothetical.
82. Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1287 (N.D. Fla.
2011).
83. Florida, 684 F.3d at 1285.
84. Id. at 1286.
85. Id. at 1291.
86. Id. at 1292.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
is the fact that the Wickard court did assume that the statute would force
Filburn to buy wheat in the market. The Wickard Court wrote, "It is said,
however, that this Act, forcing some farmers into the market to buy
wheat they could provide for themselves, is an unfair promotion of the
markets and prices of specializing wheat growers."" Speaking directly
to this protest, the Wickard Court found that the fact that citizens would
have choices imposed upon them in no way removes them from Con-
gress's commerce authority: "The stimulation of commerce is a use of
the regulatory function quite as definitely as prohibitions or restrictions
thereon."" The HHS court misses this, and focuses its attention-and its
objection-on the fact that the Mandate will force people to do some-
thing who otherwise would not.
The HHS court's focus on an activity/inactivity dichotomy is also
evident when it discusses-and coins-the "temporal leap problem."89
The court describes the "temporal leap problem" as follows:
Because the Supreme Court's prior Commerce Clause cases all deal
with already-existing activity-not the mere possibility of future
activity (in this case, health care consumption) that could implicate
interstate commerce-the Court never had to address any temporal
aspects of congressional regulation. However, the premise of the gov-
ernment's position-that most people will, at some point in the
future, consume health care-reveals that the individual mandate is
even further removed from traditional exercises of Congress's com-
merce power. 90
In diagnosing this "temporal leap problem" as a barrier to the validity of
the Individual Mandate's constitutionality, the HHS court in effect
replaces Judge Vinson's activity/inactivity dichotomy with an activity/
"mere possibility of future activity" dichotomy. 9' The Mandate, writes
the court, is "breathtaking in its expansive scope" because it regulates
"those who have not entered the health care market at all." 92 The Man-
date is overinclusive, writes the court, because it "conflates those who
presently consume health care with those who will not consume health
care for many years into the future."9 3 "Congress may regulate their
[uninsureds'] activity at the point of consumption . .. [b]ut the individ-
ual mandate does not regulate behavior at the point of consumption."94
Replacing the phrase "inactivity" with "mere possibility of future activ-
87. Wickard, 317 U.S. Ill at 129.
88. Id. at 128.
89. Florida, 684 F.3d at 1294.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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ity" makes the dichotomy no less artificial. As rephrased by the HHS
court, he dichotomy is no less unprecedented. Importantly, whether
unprecedented or not, reformulating the dichotomy does not change its
basic flaw: it breaks down completely when one considers that, as a
class, the consumption of health care by the uninsured is not a mere
possibility but rather a certainty. As the Seven-Sky court noted, Congress
"is merely imposing the mandate in reasonable anticipation of virtually
inevitable future transactions in interstate commerce."
Attempting to categorize the subject of regulation under the Indi-
vidual Mandate is no sin. "The determination of similarity or difference
is the function of each judge."" The HHS court is right to address the
importance of "maintaining the balance of the constitutional grants and
limitations" by "the gradual process of inclusion and exclusion."" But
the HHS court makes a crazy quilt of a categorization effort; its mistake
is in considering the categories it conjures as being fatal to the Mandate.
Early in the case the court dismisses the activity/inactivity dichotomy,
yet almost completely refrains from referring to the subject of regulation
as "activity." The court refers to it throughout the opinion alternatively
as the "subject matter" of regulation," as "conduct,"9 as "decisions not
to buy insurance,"' 00 and, in spite of itself, as "activity."' 0 ' The court
even writes that nicety in nomenclature is immaterial: "It is immaterial
whether we perceive Congress to be regulating inactivity or a financial
decision to forego insurance."O 2 And in what can only be an undermin-
ing of its other arguments, the court at one point identifies the future
activity "in this case" as "health care consumption."' 0 3 I want to empha-
size this. In contradiction of so many of its other statements, the court, if
inadvertently, writes (admits?) that the regulated activity "in this case" is
"health care consumption."lO4
At first the court seems headed down the right track when it recog-
nizes the futility and irrelevance of artificial distinctions between pro-
duction and distribution, etc., and between activity and inactivity. But
the court narrows its view to, and hangs its objections on, the individual
95. Seven-Sky at 18; see also Thomas More Law Ctr. 651 F.3d at 543 ("Virtually everyone
participates in the market for health care delivery, and they finance these services by either
purchasing an insurance policy or by self-insuring.")
96. Levi, supra note 17, at 2
97. Florida, 684 F.3d at 1283.
98. Id. at 1286.
99. Id. at 1293.
100. Id. at 1297.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1293.
103. Id. at 1294.
104. Id.
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affected by the Mandate who never will consume health care. For the
court, in reaching this individual, the Mandate goes too far because this
individual is not engaged in activity. His is only the "mere possibility of
future activity." The court writes that "the government adroitly and nar-
rowly redefines the regulated activity as the uninsured's health care con-
sumption and attendant cost-shifting, or the timing and method of
payment for such consumption."' 0 ' Yet defining the regulated activity as
the uninsured's consumption of health care is rather a broad take on the
matter. The HHS court's is the narrow understanding of the regulated
"activity," confined as it is to the individual affected by the Mandate
who never will consume health care. The court so confines its view
apparently because it just cannot get over the idea that the Mandate is
regulating inactivity; or, reformulated, the "mere possibility of future
activity." Yet what this "activity" is, the court is never able to defini-
tively say. The court finds numerous, contradictory ways of describing
it, but amid the confusion, provides no answer to what it describes as
"the central issue in this case: what is the nature of the conduct being
regulated by the individual mandate, and may Congress reach it?"O 6
Rather, it expresses concern over and over again that the Mandate's sub-
ject of regulation (whatever it is) seems "removed from the traditional
subjects of Congress's commerce authority of Congress's Commerce
authority."'O7 The HHS court does not provide a convincing, principled
reason why; it only objects that the Mandate is forcing some people to
do something they otherwise might not do. In other words, it regulates
inactivity-a constitutionally irrelevant objection.
The best answer to the question of what the Mandate regulates is
uninsureds' "health care consumption,"' 0 an activity in which unin-
sured Americans as a class indisputably engage. Most uninsured Ameri-
cans will consume health care. The Mandate regulates this consumption
by requiring most Americans to purchase and maintain minimum essen-
tial health coverage. The HHS majority's confusion over what the regu-
lated activity is and how to define it leads to its diverse and inconsistent
appellations, including to its (if inadvertent) description of the activity as
the consumption of health care. Whether any description of the Man-
date's subject of regulation will ever reign, the lesson to be learned from
the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause decisions is that the definition
(or the description, or the category) of the subject of regulation is not of
paramount importance. After all, the Constitution is "one of enumera-
105. Id. at 1297.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1292.
108. Id. at 1294.
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tion, and not of definition."lO9 Furthermore, "commerce among the
states is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from
the course of business."110 This wisdom is reflected in the Sixth Cir-
cuit's identification of the "class of activities that the minimum coverage
provision regulates"": "set against the Act's broader statutory scheme,
the minimum coverage provision reveals itself as a regulation on the
activity of participating in the national market for health care delivery,
and specifically the activity of self-insuring for the cost of these ser-
vices."I 12 The court acknowledges the imprecision of its formulation.
"We use the term self-insurance for ease of discussion. We note, how-
ever, that it is actually a misnomer because no insurance is involved, and
might be better described as risk retention."'1 " This is a functional iden-
tification of the regulated activity, self-acknowledged as inexact, and
placed properly in context of the Act's "broader statutory scheme."
"Congress reasonably determined that as a class, the uninsured create
market failures; thus, the lack of harm attributable to any particular unin-
sured individual, like their lack of overt participation in a market, is of
no consequence."" 4
B. Limiting Principles
The cases addressing the Individual Mandate are concerned (again,
some more than others) with limiting principles, and the perceived pres-
ence or absence of them. After all, "the kind of reasoning involved in the
legal process is one in which the classification changes as the classifica-
tion is made.""' When a court validates a congressional exercise of the
commerce power, it validates similar exercises of the power as well.
Considering the ambiguity present in Congress's plenary commerce
power, the apprehension is that a judicial validation of its exercise,
unless properly cabined, will open the door to previously and properly
impermissible exercises. The disagreeing Circuits provide different for-
mulations of the limits on the commerce power. They address the lack of
limiting principles provided by the government to cabin a judicial vali-
dation of the Mandate, but only the Eleventh Circuit considers this fatal.
As an initial matter, it is worth remembering what the limits of the
commerce power are, as originally formulated. "This power, [to regulate
commerce,] like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may
109. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189.
110. Swift & Co., 96 U.S at 398.
111. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 542.
112. Id. at 543.
113. Id. at 543 n.3.
114. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 20.
115. Levi, supra note 17, at 3.
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be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other
than are prescribed in the constitution."' 16 Of course, in interpreting
what those constitutional limits may be, courts over time have counte-
nanced some exercises of the commerce power and discountenanced
others. Some previously imposed limits, such as on mining and manu-
facturing, have been rejected. Other distinctions, such as economic ver-
sus non-economic, are recognized in Lopez and Morrison and are valid
precedent.
Recalling the limitations countenanced in Lopez and Morrison, the
Seven-Sky court found that "the only recognized limitations [on the com-
merce power] are that (1) Congress may not regulate non-economic
behavior based solely on an attenuated link to interstate commerce, and
(2) Congress may not regulate intrastate economic behavior if its aggre-
gate impact on interstate commerce is negligible."'" The court found
with no difficulty that the Individual Mandate "certainly is focused on
economic behavior . . . that does substantially affect interstate com-
merce.""' This is unsurprising, when one considers the congressional
findings: "National health spending is expected to increase from $
2,500,000,000,000, or 17.6 percent of the economy, in 2009 to $
4,700,000,000,000 in 2019. Private health insurance spending is pro-
jected to be $ 854,000,000,000 in 2009"; "The economy loses up to $
207,000,000,000 a year because of the poorer health and shorter lifespan
of the uninsured.""' 9
The Thomas More court recognized that the Supreme Court has
"emphasized in two recent cases that this [the commerce] power is sub-
ject to real limits."l 2 0 The court recognized four main factors based on
which the statutes in Lopez and Morrison were struck down:
(1) the statutes regulated non-economic, criminal activity and
were not part of a larger regulation of economic activity; (2) the stat-
utes contained no jurisdictional hook limiting their application to
interstate commerce; (3) any Congressional findings regarding the
effects of the regulated activity on interstate commerce were not suf-
ficient to sustain constitutionality of the legislation; and (4) the link
between the regulated activity and interstate commerce was too
attenuated. 121
The Individual Mandate lies safely within these limits. Unless one were
to focus, as does the HHS court, on only those individuals who do not
116. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196.
117. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 16.
118. Id.
119. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(2)(B), (E).
120. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 542.
121. Id. (citations omitted).
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consume health care and never will, the Mandate regulates economic
activity, as the Seven-Sky court easily found.122 The jurisdictional hook
poses no problem here; the Affordable Care Act contains many: "The
individual responsibility requirement provided for in this section . .. is
commercial and economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate
commerce"; "Private health insurance spending . . . pays for medical
supplies, drugs, and equipment that are shipped in interstate com-
merce." 23 As aforementioned, there are voluminous congressional find-
ings regarding the effect of the regulated activity on interstate
commerce. And a big part of the trouble with the statutes at issue in
Morrison and Lopez, that caused those Courts to find the link to com-
merce too attenuated, was that they regulated criminal activity. The
Affordable Care Act does not regulate criminal activity. Further, health
care consumption through insurance is not nearly as tenuously related to
commerce as were the plaintiffs' validly regulated activities in Wickard
and Raich. The Seven-Sky court recognized this: "if Congress can regu-
late even instances of purely local conduct that were never intended for,
or entered, an interstate market, we think Congress can also regulate
instances of ostensible inactivity inside a state."' 2 4
The HHS Court, for its part, overly emphasizes the Commerce
Clause's limits without demonstrating that the Individual Mandate actu-
ally transgresses them. The court reminds us over and over again that the
Commerce Clause is "not without limitation"' 2 5 ; that "the 'powers of the
legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mis-
taken, or forgotten, the constitution is written' "1126; that "even when the
Supreme Court has blessed Congress's most expansive invocations of
the Commerce Clause, it has done so with a word of warning."127 The
court identifies these limits as follows:
The Supreme Court has placed two broad limitations on congres-
sional power under the Commerce Clause. First, Congress's regula-
tion must accommodate the Constitution's federalist structure and
preserve "a distinction between what is truly national and what is
truly local." Second, the Court has repeatedly warned that courts may
not interpret the Commerce Clause in a way that would grant to Con-
gress a general police power, "which the Founders denied the
National Government and reposed in the States. "128
122. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 16.
123. § 18091(1), (2)(B).
124. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 19.
125. Florida, 648 F.3d at 1278.
126. Id. at 1282 (citations omitted).
127. Id. at 1283.
128. Id. at 1284 (citations omitted).
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So important are limiting principles to the HHS that it understands them
as the glue that holds all Commerce Clause analytical efforts together.
"[C]onfusing though these dichotomies and doctrinal vacillations have
been, they appear animated by one overarching goal: to provide courts
with meaningful, judicially administrable limiting principles by which to
assess Congress's exercise of its Commerce Clause power."l This is
reminiscent of the appellants' argument in Seven-Sky, and it merits that
court's response to it: Since the HHS court "cannot find real support for
their proposed [activity/inactivity] rule in either the text of the Constitu-
tion or Supreme Court precedent, they emphasize both the novelty of the
mandate and the lack of a limiting principle." 3 0 Indeed, the HHS court
takes a tortuous route from emphasizing the limits. on the commerce
power to concluding that the Mandate transgresses them. It is worth not-
ing that in the HHS decision, under the section titled "First Principles" in
which its formulation of the Commerce Clause's limits appear, there is
no mention of the economic/non-economic distinction that actually did
matter to the Lopez and Morrison Courts.'3 ' Instead, the HHS court for-
mulates its understanding of the Commerce Clause's limits, and faults
the government for not providing limiting principles inherent in the
Mandate that satisfy them. The government describes the factual unique-
ness of the health care and health insurance markets. These markets are
characterized uniquely by the inevitability of health care need, the
unpredictability of such need, high costs, the federal requirement that
hospitals treat individuals regardless of ability to pay, and the associated
cost-shifting.' 32 The court characterizes this as the government's "uni-
queness argument,"' 3 and "the government's proposed limiting fac-
tors,"l 34 which it then dismisses. The government's "proposed limiting
factors" have two flaws, according to the court: "The first problem with
the government's proposed limiting factors is their lack' of constitutional
relevance."' The "second fatal problem with the government's pro-
posed limits" is "administrability."I 36
The court suggests that it would not be satisfied that the Mandate is
valid unless the government were to provide judicially enforceable limit-
ing principles to cabin the precedent. But the court ascribes too much
weight to the government's responsibility to provide limiting principles.
129. Id.at 1287.
130. Seven-Sky, 661 U.S. at 18.
131. The court does discuss that distinction later in the opinion. See 648 F.3d at 1286.
132. Id. at 1295.
133. Id. at 1297.
134. Id. at 1295.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1296.
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Saying that the government has not provided limiting principles to
couch this particular exercise of the commerce power is not the same as
concluding that the Mandate exceeds the commerce power's outer lim-
its. Statutes are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality.' It is
proper to overturn a statute only upon a plain showing of its unconstitu-
tionality,'3 " not upon the defendant's failure to conjure "limiting princi-
ples" to the satisfaction of the court's formulation. The Seven-Sky court
addressed the issue as follows:
We acknowledge some discomfort with the Government's fail-
ure to advance any clear doctrinal principles limiting congressional
mandates that any American purchase any product or service in inter-
state commerce. But to tell the truth, those limits are not apparent to
us, either because the power to require the entry into commerce is
symmetrical with the power to prohibit or 1condition commercial
behavior, or because we have not yet perceived a qualitative limita-
tion. That difficulty is troubling, but not fatal. . . .13
Indeed, the commerce power "is complete in itself, may be exercised to
its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are pre-
scribed in the constitution." 4 0 The limits of importance to Lopez and
Morrison were economic versus non-economic and the preservation of
what is truly national and what is truly local by guarding against too-
attenuated connections between regulated activity and interstate com-
merce. The HHS court's conclusion that the mandate is "non-economic"
in nature is undermined by the fact that that it is based on the court's
hang-up over inactivity-a constitutionally irrelevant distinction. So too
with the alleged attenuation between what the Mandate regulates and
interstate commerce. If the wholly intrastate, non-commercial use and
possession of marijuana in Raich is an appropriate subject for federal
regulation based on how it potentially withdraws from the illicit inter-
state marijuana market, then a fortiori is the uninsureds' relationship
with health care and health insurance, the current state of which, absent
federal regulation, is costing the economy $207,000,000,000 a year.' 4 '
Every case is at least limited by its facts. The Individual Mandate is
enacted pursuant to unique factors, and to a massive monetary effect on
the economy. A judicial validation of it transgresses no constitutional
limits, nor any of those recognized by the Supreme Court.
137. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 18.
138. Florida, 648 F.3d at 1284.
139. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 18.
140. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196.
141. § 42 U.S.C.A. 18091(2)(E).
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C. Aggregation
"It is not surprising that Wickard . . . provides perhaps the best
perspective on an economic mandate." 4 2 Because the Mandate regulates
a broad class of people-the uninsured-some of whom can arguably be
said will never consume health care absent the Mandate, the aggregation
principle from Wickard is relevant. It was formulated as follows: "That
appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by
itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation
where, as here, his contribution, taken to together with that of many
others similarly situated, is far from trivial."' 4 3 This principle can be
applied to the uninsured, even if any one of the uninsured's consumption
of health care is "trivial." In Wickard and Raich, the plaintiffs' home
consumption of wheat and marijuana, respectively, withdrew from the
respective interstate markets in those commodities. However trivial the
individual's harm to interstate commerce, the regulations were consid-
ered valid due to the aggregate effect of all those similarly situated.
Here, the uninsured, in the aggregate contribute immense harm to inter-
state commerce due to the well-documented process of cost-shifting:
The cost of providing uncompensated care to the uninsured was $
43,000,000,000 in 2008. To pay for this cost, health care providers
pass on the cost to private insurers, which pass on the cost to fami-
lies. This cost-shifting increases family premiums by on average over
$ 1,000 a year. By significantly reducing the number of the unin-
sured, the requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act,
will lower health insurance premiums. 4
The HHS court concludes that the aggregation principle cannot
apply. It is clear that the court's reasoning is again bound up in its hang-
up over inactivity. The court recognizes the importance of the regulated
activity's connection to interstate commerce (that it not be too attenu-
ated). It then concludes that aggregation cannot apply, not because the
regulated acitivity's connection to interstate commerce is too attenuated,
but because "the regulated conduct is defined by the absence of . . .
142. Florida, 648 F.3d at 1291.
143. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28 (citations omitted).
144. § 42 U.S.C.A. 18091(2)(F); see also § 42 U.S.C.A. 18091(2)(G) ("62 percent of all
personal bankruptcies are caused in part by medical expenses."). In one of the ironies of the
Individual Mandate litigation, "respondent Mary Brown" of the HHS case (who challenges the
constitutionality of the Individual Mandate) "and her husband recently filed a petition for
bankruptcy, and they list among their liabilities thousands of dollars in unpaid medical bills,
including bills from out-of-state providers. . .. Those liabilities are uncompensated care that will
ultimately be paid for by other market participants." Brief for Petitioner at 44 Dep't of Health &
Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398, 2002 U.S. S. Cr. Briefs LEXIS 1211 at 81 (U.S. argued Mar.
27, 2012).
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commerce."l45 The HHS court seems to forget how the Raich court cau-
tioned temperence: "We need not determine whether respondents' activ-
ities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in
fact, but only whether a 'rational basis' exists for so concluding."1 46 The
court similarly forgets the broad potential afforded the aggregation prin-
ciple by the Morrison Court: "we need not adopt a categorical rule
against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to
decide these cases . ".. Even were the mandate's subject of regula-
tion not to be considered economic activity (which the HHS court fails
to establish) or even were the mandate's subject of regulation not to be
considered activity of any kind, precedent does not preclude it from
aggregation. "No Supreme Court case has ever held or implied that Con-
gress's Commerce Clause authority is limited to individuals who are
presently engaged in activity involving, or substantially affecting, inter-
state commerce."l 4 8
The Seven-Sky court rejected reasoning similar to that of the HHS
court: "Whether any 'particular person . . . is, or is not, also engaged in
interstate commerce,' the Supreme Court expressly held, is a mere 'for-
tuitous circumstance' that has no bearing on Congress's power to regu-
late an injury to interstate commerce."l 4 9 The Thomas More court
highlights a major flaw in arguments against the Mandate's constitution-
ality-that the proper scrutiny for it is a rational basis inquiry. 1o "Con-
gress had a rational basis to believe that the practice of self-insuring for
the cost of health care, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate
commerce"151; "Congress found that the aggregate cost of providing
uncompensated care to the uninsured in 2008 was $43 billion" 52 ; "the
rational basis test applies to Congress's judgment."s153
"Although any decision not to purchase a good or service entails
commercial consequences," the HHS court writes, "this does not warrant
the facile conclusion that Congress may therefore regulate these deci-
sions pursuant to the Commerce Clause."15 4 "Instead," the court con-
cludes, "what matters is the regulated subject matter's connection to
145. Florida, 648 F.3d at 1293.
146. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (citations omitted).
147. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
148. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 16.
149. Id. at 19.
150. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 ("We need not determine whether respondents' activities, taken
in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a 'rational
basis' exists for so concluding.").
151. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at at 544.
152. Id. at 545.
153. Id.
154. 648 F.3d at 1292-93.
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interstate commerce. That nexus is lacking here. It is immaterial whether
we perceive Congress to be regulating inactivity or a financial decision
to forego insurance. Under any framing, the regulated conduct is defined
by the absence of both commerce or even the 'production, distribution,
and consumption of commodities'-the broad definition of economics
in Raich."'"5 In other words, Congress cannot regulate the "conduct"
because it lacks a connection to commerce. It lacks a connection to com-
merce because it is defined as an absence of both commerce and (the
definition of) commerce. The dismissal of the government's argument is
devoid of justification and the conclusion is devoid of deduction. It
declares that, "even assuming that decisions not to buy insurance sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce, that fact alone hardly renders them
a suitable subject for regulation,"1 56 yet does not explain what additional
facts (surely there are some) would render them a suitable subject for
regulation. It concludes that Congress cannot reach the conduct at issue
because the conduct lacks a connection to commerce: "[U]nder any
framing," the "conduct" at issue lacks a connection to commerce
because it is not commerce. This is pure tautology, and, as such, more
"facile" than the government's argument. In just the previous paragraph
the court appears to hang its objection on an overbreadth argument'15 in
writing that "any decision not to purchase a good or service entails com-
mercial consequences."158 But this contradicts its conclusion that the
regulated conduct is defined by an absence of commerce. In doing this
the court fails to distinguish the regulated "conduct"- which it
describes but never defines-from validly regulated conduct. Preceding
the section of the opinion on Wickard and aggregation, the court writes
that it is "left to apply some basic Commerce Clause principles derived
largely from Wickard, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich."' 9 Instead, it nar-
rows the issue too much and declares that the "basic Commerce Clause
principle" of aggregation cannot be applied. It tautologically concludes
that the "conduct" cannot be regulated because it lacks a connection to
commerce because it is defined by an absence of commerce.
The fact is that the uninsured do consume health care services.
Most of them eventually will.' 60 For precisely this reason, it is inaccu-
155. Id. at 1293.
156. Id.
157. "Such an argument is prompted by the worry that the linguistic or doctrinal boundaries of
the principle or rule under discussion embrace the danger case." Frederick Schauer, Slippery
Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 366 (1985). The "danger case" is that "hypothetical but potentially
real future state of affairs" which is "the source of our fears . . Id. at 365.
158. 648 F.3d at 1292.
159. Id. at 1291.
160. See Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 4 ("Congress found that without the mandate, uninsured
individuals, in the aggregate, would consume costly health care services and pass on those costs to
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rate to call uninsureds "individuals outside the stream of commerce." As
a class, uninsureds will consume health care services, even if not all of
them will, even though some never will. The mandate requires all of
them (with many exceptions) to consume their health care services
through health insurance, which they must purchase and maintain. The
HHS court avoids this reality in its analysis by whittling the issue down
to the Mandate's application to those uninsureds who never will con-
sume health care services-a class of individuals smaller than that
which the Mandate reaches. Only by doing so can the court characterize
"the regulated conduct" as being "defined by the absence of . . .
commerce."1 6 1
IV. THE SLIPPERY SLOPE AND FEDERALISM CONCERNS
Failing on legal and doctrinal fronts, opponents of the Mandate
must rely on arguments of another sort.
A. The Slippery Slope
"Both the slippery slope argument and most of its similar but dis-
tinguishable compatriots involve a common theme-the contrast
between a tolerable solution to a problem now before us and an intolera-
ble result with respect to some currently hypothetical but potentially real
future state of affairs."'6 2 The former is the "instant case" and the lat-
ter-"the source of our fears"-is the "danger case."l 6 3 Many of the
objections to the Individual Mandate resort to such slippery slope argu-
ments. If the Individual Mandate is a valid exercise of the commerce
power, the argument goes, then Congress will regulate anyone and any-
thing; judicial validation will be the "first step in what will be a long
slide."' 6 4 Here are just a few examples:
"If an individual's mere decision not to purchase insurance were
subject to Wickard's aggregation principle, we are unable to conceive of
any product whose purchase Congress could not mandate under this line
of argument."' 6 5
"Under the government's proposed limiting principles, there is no
reason why Congress could not similarly compel Americans to insure
other market participants."); 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(2)(F) ("The cost of providing uncompensated
care to the uninsured was $ 43,000,000,000 in 2008.").
161. 648 F.3d at 1293.
162. Schauer, 99 HARV. L. REV. at 364-65.
163. Id. at 365.
164. William Safire, On Language; Slippery Slope, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at Section 6,
Column 3, Magazine Desk, Pg. 24.
165. Florida, 648 F.3d at 1292.
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against any number of unforeseeable but serious risks." 66
"[If the Individual Mandate is a valid exercise of the commerce
authority, then] Congress could undoubtedly require every American to
purchase liability insurance, lest the consequences of their negligence or
inattention lead to unfunded costs (medical and otherwise) passed on to
others."l 6 7
Were we to adopt the "limiting principles" proffered by the govern-
ment, courts would sit in judgment over every economic mandate
issued by Congress, determining whether the level of participation in
the underlying market, the amount of cost-shifting, the unpredictabil-
ity of need, or the strength of the moral imperative were enough to
justify the mandate.' 6
"If an individual's decision not to purchase an expensive product is
subject to the sweeping doctrine of aggregation, then that purchase deci-
sion will almost always substantially affect interstate commerce." 6 9
Andrew Koppelman humorously refers to this type of objection to
the Mandate as the "Broccoli Objection."' This was inspired by Judge
Vinson's fear that, if the Mandate is constitutional, then "'Congress
could require that people buy and consume broccoli at regular inter-
vals.""' This type of objection is a corollary to courts' focus on the
lack of limiting principles offered by defendants. Where will the com-
merce power end? How does the Mandate define its limits? This is
"what the law's opponents have demanded: an account of the limits of
congressional power."17 2 Yet, again, this line of attack is flawed; a fail-
ure of government defendants to satisfy this question is not the same as
identifying whether or how the Mandate exceeds the commerce power's
outer limits. Opponents to the Mandate have trouble showing exactly
how the Mandate does this, so they resort to a slippery slope argument.
Koppelman writes that a flaw with such a "Broccoli Objection" is that it
involves "treating a slippery slope argument as a logical one, when in
fact it is an empirical one." 7 1 It is markedly unrealistic that Congress
ever would mandate the purchase of broccoli, even if it could. Therefore,
Koppelman writes, "[i]f there is no danger, then the fact that there logi-
cally could be has no weight." 74 This is not right. The fact that there
logically could be is the danger. In this way the "Broccoli Objection" is
166. Id. at 1296.
167. Id. at 1296 n.103.
168. Id. at 1296-97.
169. Id. at 1311.
170. Koppelman, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE at *19.
171. Id. at *18 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1289).
172. Id. at *3.
173. Id. at *20.
174. Id. at *20
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indeed a logical one, albeit strained. "Logicians are very cautious about
slippery slope arguments because it is impossible to know beforehand,
with absolute deductive certainty, that an 'if-then' statement is true."17 5
Still, it is important and entirely valid to be concerned over the logical
extensions of a principle, especially one being enacted into law. For
example, it is small comfort that President Obama assures us he won't
detain American citizens indefinitely,617 when he does so with the same
stroke of his pen that appears to codify into law his ability to do so.' 77
We may not expect Congress to mandate the purchase of broccoli, but
we may fear its ability to do so.
Koppelman convinces me that "Congress is never going to try to
make you eat your broccoli,""' even if it could. Yet to assuage the fears
of those who see a logical connection between the Mandate and congres-
sionally mandated broccoli consumption, the Government's five factors
of uniqueness in HHS do come in handy. An argument that an enactment
of the Individual Mandate leads to congressional omnipotence forgets
that cases are limited by their facts as well as their logic. The health care
industry is unique in many respects, and the factors that the government
identifies are significant in that they do cabin the case's precedent, and
undermine slippery slope arguments against the Mandate. "There are
manifest differences between broccoli and health insurance: no one
unavoidably needs broccoli; it is not unpredictable when one will need
broccoli; broccoli is not expensive; providers are permitted by law to
refuse it; and there is no significant cost-shifting in the way it is pro-
vided." 7 9 Suggesting that America will be run over by this photosyn-
thetic parade of horribles immediately upon the enactment of the
Individual Mandate ignores these realities. The Mandate can be distin-
guished in fact and in principle from other hypothetical federal
encroachments. Its constitutionality does not stand atop a slippery slope.
B. Federalism Concerns
Arguments against the Mandate rest at last on what the HHS court
calls "federalism concerns."Is "The Supreme Court's Commerce Clause
175. Safire, supra note 164, at 24.
176. Barack Obama, Statement by the President on H.R. 1540 (Dec. 31, 2011), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/31/statement-president-hr-1540 ("I want to clarify that
my Administration will not authorize the indefinite military detention without trial of American
citizens.").
177. See H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. § 102 1(c) (2011).
178. Koppelman, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE at *20.
179. Id. at *19-20.
180. Florida, 648 F.3d at 1302. Cf Arthur J.R. Baker, Fundamental Mismatch: The Improper
Integration of Individual Liberty Rights into Commerce Clause Analysis of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 296 (arguing that the attacks on the Affordable
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jurisprudence emphasizes that, in assessing the constitutionality of Con-
gress's exercise of its commerce authority, a relevant factor is whether a
particular federal regulation trenches on an area of traditional state con-
cern."'"' The HHS court writes that "insurance qualifies as an area of
traditional state regulation" and that the "health care industry also falls
within the sphere of traditional state regulation."' 82 It concludes that
"Congress's encroachment upon these areas of traditional state concern
is yet another factor that weighs in the plaintiffs' favor, and strengthens
the inference that the individual mandate exceeds constitutional bounda-
ries."' It is not necessary to dwell on the assertion "that health care and
health insurance are uniquely state concerns"; as the Seven-Sky court
notes, "decades of established federal legislation in these areas suggest
the contrary."l 8 4 Koppelman sees in such objections "an implicit liberta-
rianism which focuses on the burden a law imposes on individuals and
pays no attention at all to legitimate state interests."' 8 5 Such sentiments
come through in federalism-based objections to the Mandate, as in Judge
Graham's dissent in Thomas More Law Ctr.: "Here, Congress's exercise
of power intrudes on both the States and the people."' 8 6 These objec-
tions are a final leg to stand on where textual and doctrinal arguments
fail. They are inchoate, and unconvincing. Of the 27 times the HHS
court cites to concurring and dissenting opinions (primarily Scalia's and
Kennedy's) in its Commerce Clause Analysis, they most heavily rely on
them (nine cites) in its section on "Areas of Traditional State
Concern."' 8 7
Absent a violation of a constitutional provision, and absent trans-
gressions forbidden by precedent, Courts have treated such government
intrusions as a matter of fairness better left to the political process. The
Wickard Court acknowledged that the Agricultural Adjustment Act
would have the effect of "forcing some farmers into the market,"' but
found no constitutional infirmity there. It said that such effects were
unfortunate to those affected by them, but ultimately a question of fair-
ness not to be determined by the Court: "It is the essence of regulation
that it lays a restraining hand on the self-interest of the regulated and
Care Act "represent an attempt to shift Commerce Clause analysis away from its well-settled
federalism principles to a focus on individual liberty.").
181. Id. at 1303 (citations omitted).
182. Id. at 1304.
183. Id. at 1306.
184. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 19 (citing United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322
U.S. 533, 539 (1944); Florida, 648 F.3d at 1302-03).
185. Koppelman, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE at *22 (providing examples) (citation omitted).
186. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 571 (Graham, J., Dissenting).
187. Florida, 648 F.3d at 1302.
188. Wickard, 317 U.S. 111 at 129.
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that advantages from the regulation commonly fall to others. The con-
flicts of economic interest between the regulated and those who advan-
tage by it are wisely left under our system to resolution by the Congress
under its more flexible and responsible legislative process."' 8 9 The
Seven-Sky court makes the appropriate observation here: "That a direct
requirement for most Americans to purchase any product or service
seems an intrusive exercise of legislative power surely explains why
Congress has not used this authority before-but that seems to us a
political judgment rather than a recognition of constitutional
limitations."' 90
V. CONCLUSION
The commerce power knows no limitations other than those that are
prescribed in the Constitution. Lopez and Morrison acknowledge a
couple of restrictions. The Individual Mandate appears to violate neither
of them. For all of the adjurations by the Mandate's opponents that the
Government provide limiting principles to cabin the precedent, the
opponents are unable to show how the Mandate transgresses the outer
limits of the Commerce Clause. The best that can be mustered against
the Mandate amount to slippery slope arguments and inchoate "federal-
ism concerns," which are devoid of deduction and represent only a fear
of government encroachment; they fail to demonstrate any congressional
transgression in enacting the Mandate. If the Individual Mandate is
unconstitutional, it is not for any argument that I have encountered.
Is the Individual Mandate an encroachment on individual liberty?
Yes, but "it is no more so than a command that restaurants or hotels are
obliged to serve all customers regardless of race, that gravely ill individ-
uals cannot use a substance their doctors described as a palliative for
excruciating pain, or that a farmer cannot grow enough wheat to support
his own family. The right to be free from federal regulation is not abso-
lute, and yields to the imperative that Congress be free to forge national
solutions to national problems, no matter how local-or seemingly pas-
sive-their individual origins."l91
The "course of decision under the Commerce Clause"'92 favors a
finding of constitutionality in the congressional exercise of the com-
merce power called the Individual Mandate. A decision holding other-
189. Id.
190. Seven-Sky, 611 F.3d at 20.
191. Seven-Sky, 661 F. 3d at 20 (footnote omitted) (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379
U.S. 241, at 258-59; Raich, 545 U.S. at 6-7; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128; Thomas More, 651 F.3d at
557 (Sutton, J., concurring)).
192. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120.
1132 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1103
wise cannot exist in the same legal universe as Raich, Wickard, Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc., or the other cases recognizing the plenary nature of
Congress's commerce power and its broad reach. The uninsured will
have to purchase and maintain minimum essential health coverage. If
interstate commerce feels the pinch, it does not matter how passive, or
how inactive, the operation that applies the squeeze.
